Q. Who do you feel has been one of the most influential people in the fire industry within the last decade and why?

A. Retired Fire Chief Alan V. Brunacini of the Phoenix Fire Department –The PFD are on the leading edge of many new policies, procedures and modern technologies. They have a unique take on modern leadership and span of control and Alan had a lot to do with that.  Also, former State Fire Marshall, Ronnie Coleman.  He’s been doing fire service accreditation around the state and that’s making big differences in the quality of service being offered.  Agencies are reviewed using a set of criteria which verify that departments are doing what they’re supposed to be doing.  This helps raise the bar in terms of their service to the community and being accredited gives departments ammunition in the fight for funding.

Q. Who has been your biggest influence and why?

A. Alan Brunacini – He’s not enamored with tech and he’s a big proponent of safety.  He won’t let firefighters take risks over property, especially when it’s only going to be torn down a few days later anyway.  He always asks the question “What are we risking here?”  Life risks are taken only for life saves.

Q. What changes do you see (or imagine) coming to the fire service within the span of the 21st century?

A. The core mission will remain the same, but expansion in the medical field would be good.  The scope of practice for the paramedic is what it is, but bringing in more advanced techniques and a broader reach with drugs could be beneficial.  One potential change I hope doesn’t happen is the idea that more and more will be done at the Fire station itself.  Getting stitches at the ER takes forever; it might start being done at the Fire House.

I think we’ll need to prove our public value and worth through accreditation. Take our budget (which pushes $50 million dollars a year) and consider if that much money was even at fire risk over the course of the year. What is it really worth to go in, stop a fire, and save a house which is going to end up being torn down and rebuilt anyway?

Q. What do think the biggest “hole” in firefighter equipment is today?

A. We struggle in getting all people in the fire service to understand the value we need to provide to the public. We need to understand how important public value is.  The big budget and these fire engines need to “enhance” the value of living in the city in which we live. “I think the fire service believes its own press-clippings.  Also, we still kill people (firefighters) for no good reason. We need to recognize what’s worth the life risks we’re taking.

Q. In regards to fire prevention, what changes need to come, and where have we seen recent success?

A. Residential sprinkler ordinances have been a huge success.  Problem is, the building industry fights us at every turn.  Also, we need to ban wood-shake roofs.  We need to have the insurance industry come down on people who do not take proper fire prevention precautions.  I see homes all the time that are un-savable, but could easily be modified for fire prevention.

We are seeing success in hazard and weed abatement.  Between The “cedar fire” in San Diego county and the “Witch Fire” (2003 and 2007)…. they set up the reverse 911 system which did a tremendous job getting people out of the way of those fires, and ultimately saved a lot of lives.

Q. Are you familiar with any of the following emerging technologies?* (*See The Future Of Firefighting post)

A. I’m not a big fan of “technology” because I view it as a huge cash cow for businesses trying to invent the next big hit.  I find we always go “back to basics” for which they have training programs of the same name.  We are seeing certain additives to water which are allowing us to improve the effectiveness of our “basic” firefighting practices.  The more technology there is, the more room there is for it to break down.  I’m a big fan of simple & reliable.  I see more and more information systems like PASS and air status systems which help, though I still do pretty well with my clip board.

Q. Do you see the governments’ financial problems affecting the future of firefighter salaries and retirement packages?

A. I do.  It’s tough because you’re dealing with negotiated union contracts which are fairly safe.  Still, there are a lot of public entities who are reliant on the government having money to pay them.  I think we’ll see a tiered system in the future.  Something’s gotta give.

One of the most tragic aspects of this fire was the fact that the audience was made up primarily of women and children, as the show they had gone to see “Mr. Bluebeard” was a Wednesday matinee playing during the holiday season. The theater was actually not supposed to be open and ready by then, but in an effort to take advantage of the holiday and sell more tickets, construction of the theater was rushed, leaving some of it incomplete. In addition, on that particular Monday afternoon, the theater had about 2,000 customers. Its occupancy limit was 1,724.

1. Gravestone of a victim

It was well into the second act that the fire started. A spark from a malfunctioning light ignited a drop curtain and the fire started. It spread quickly catching fire to drapery, decorations, and thousands of square feet of canvas scenery flats. Roof vents intended to handle smoke and heat had been sealed off, preventing the heat, smoke and gases from escaping – a result of the hurried construction. A fire curtain was supposed to lowered, but as luck would have it, the stage hand trained in its operation was out sick and his replacement was not prepared to manage it.

Despite the orchestra continuing to play, some of the actors found egress through a backstage door. This was good for them, but terrible for those patrons still up in the balconies. When the door opened, a huge influx of fresh air was pulled into the theater blowing the flames from the stage, right over the orchestra as well as a large portion of the audience, heat and smoke rising to the balconies.

2. The scene when the fire began is highlighted by the star symbol on the left.

Two stage hands had tried hopelessly to the insufficient extinguishing tools available, but the fire was growing too big, too fast. The thousands of audience members began scrambling to escape, but due to the over-packed crowd there was no way for them to escape the small main doorway. Fire exits existed, but were either hidden by curtains, poorly marked (if marked at all), and in some cases, locked, to keep unpaid patron out. The theater employees were untrained and unprepared for a disaster such as this.

3. Officials measuring the exit where hundreds were killed and burned. Many of the exits opened inward, or were simply locked.

Finally, the flames grew so great that nobody could escape. Those who tried, had to crawl over the bodies of the dead or dying. Still, many were trapped by metal fencing used to separate the cheaper seating from the more expensive. A few jumped from windows, and some of them lived, for their fall was cushioned by the victims who came before them. A few more escaped by a variety of means, but almost half of the people in attendance that day, perished.

This was one of our countries most significant fires, but it didn’t end with only the loss of life. As a result of this tragedy, Chicago shut down all of its theaters until they underwent inspection and any needed renovations to ensure their fire safety.

The rest of America soon followed in those footsteps implementing new laws, regulations and codes regarding fire safety. They did this based on a number of lessons learned from the catastrophe that was the Iroquois Theater Fire (ITF).

4. Charred and darkened remains of the theater.

First, it was determined that all exits need to be clearly marked, unobstructed and easily operated. The Iroquois Theater had actually used a European style lock called a bascule lock, which Americans were unfamiliar with.

In addition, locked gates blocked the descending stairs exiting the balcony sections. Another thing to come about as a result of the fire was the crash bar, also known as a panic bar.

At the time, automatic sprinklers were a fairly new thing. If the Iroquois Theater had installed them, it can be reasoned that this tragedy never would have happened. Consequently, theater stages must now be protected by sprinklers.

Draperies and curtains need to be fire resistive. These were the primary reason that growth stage of the ITF happened so fast. Between the draperies, curtains, decorations and wood, the theater has such a tremendous fuel load, the fire grew out of control very quickly. Fire resistive materials would have slowed or even halted this growth.

Greed is bad, bad thing. Just as theater management rushed construction for that extra holiday money, they also let it way more people than the building allowed for. This caused major crowding and egress problems when the fire started and it is documented that very many of the people who died that day, were crushed or trampled by other patrons. This led to much stricter enforcement of building occupant load limits.

As mentioned earlier, two employees tried feebly to extinguish the fire. When that effort failed, panic and chaos quickly set in among everybody in the building. If employees had been trained in emergency evacuation procedures, they may have been able to help facilitate an orderly and effective escape.

Ultimately, the incident at the Iroquois Theater was a horrible tragedy that resulted in great improvements in multiple aspects of fire safety including policies, procedures, ordinances and design.

REFERENCES CITED

FPP (2005) Fire Prevention Applications (1st editon) pg. 11
Oaklahoma State University; Stillwater Oaklahoma
“tragedy.” The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004. Dictionary.com http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/tragedy
“Iroquois Theater Fire.” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. 28 Mar 2009,

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Iroquois_Theater_Fire&oldid=280257619

“Iroquois Theater Fire.” Chicagology (As viewed April 11, 2009)

http://chicagology.com/notorious-chicago/iroquois-theatre/

“The Iroquois Theater Fire.” Eastland Memorial Society (April 11, 2009)

http://www.inficad.com/~ksup/iroquois.html

“A Tragedy Remembered” National Fire Protection Association , NFAP Journal July/August 1995 http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/PDF/iroquois.pdf
“Exit Devices: Von Duprin Changes the Face of Commercial Security”; Nov 5, 2008
Article Alley Jenny Schweyer, http://www.articlealley.com/article_683377_15.html
Images
Img. 1 – Flickr (johnmartine63) flickr.com/photos/johnmartine63/476059178/
Img. 2, 3 – Karl J. Sup Collection, Eastland Memorial Society (April 11, 2009)

http://www.inficad.com/~ksup/iroquois0.html

Img. 4 – Chicago Tribune, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/chi-chicagodays-iroquoisfire-story,0,6395565.story